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Notes and Comments
United States v. Monsanto: The Supreme Court
Swings and Misses - Attorney Fee Forfeiture
Under RICO and CCE
I. Introduction
Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 19701
(1970 Act) in an effort to combat the growth of organized crime
as an economic enterprise. 2 The Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations (RICO) 3 chapter and the Continuing Crimi-
nal Enterprise (CCE)" section of the 1970 Act promulgated new
mechanisms for reaching racketeering activity and supplied civil
and criminal remedies, particularly criminal forfeiture, to curtail
such activity.5 Despite these legislative efforts, the 1970 Act re-
ceived mixed reviews because defendants retained the ability to
dispose of targeted assets prior to conviction.6
Nearly fourteen years later, the inadequacies of the forfei-
ture procedures7 of the 1970 Act forced Congress to amend the
pertinent provisions of RICO and CCE. The Comprehensive
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-451, 84 Stat. 922.
2. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (unanimous Court found
that the legislative history indicated that organized crime derived its economic power
from illegal profits, and that Congress intended for these illegal profits to fall within the
purview of RICO forfeiture).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
5. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
6. The ability of an accused to simply funnel his money or assets to third parties
exemplifies the incompleteness of the 1970 Act. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying
text.
7. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
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Forfeiture Act of 19848 (CFA) was the vehicle designed to effect
the original legislative spirit of the 1970 Act.' The CFA employs
expansive language to determine what is forfeitable: "any prop-
erty constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, as the result"1 of a conviction. A
question arises, however, whether defense attorneys' fees are in-
cluded within the CFA's expansive phraseology concerning prop-
erty subject to forfeiture." Assuming, arguendo, that attorneys'
fees are forfeitable, the essential inquiry becomes whether such
a result violates the fifth or the sixth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court squarely addressed this
issue in United States v. Monsanto.2 The Court held that a de-
fendant charged with violations of the RICO and CCE statutes
may not pay his defense attorneys' fees from funds identified by
the government to have been linked to that alleged criminal ac-
tivity.13 It is the contention of this Note that, notwithstanding
this recent five-to-four decision, permitting forfeiture of legiti-
mate attorneys' fees under the CFA violates basic constitutional
safeguards. 4
Part II of this Note presents a historical development of
forfeiture law and its current application in the CFA context.
Part III sets forth a statement of the facts surrounding defend-
ant Peter Monsanto's claims. It briefly examines the Second Cir-
cuit opinion and then focuses on the Supreme Court decision.
Part IV analyzes the arguments favoring an exemption of attor-
neys' fees from the grasp of statutory forfeiture. Part V con-
cludes that the CFA should be revised to provide for a
postindictment, pretrial hearing and an increase in the govern-
ment's burden of proof so that the accused is afforded a fair and
adequate trial. This revision would provide a more balanced dis-
tribution of representational opportunities.
8. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (codi-
fied as added and amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 31 & 37-40 and accompanying text.
12. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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II. Background
A. The Origin of Forfeiture
The concept of forfeiture is not a recent phenomenon; soci-
ety's redistribution measures for wrongful acts are of biblical or-
igin." There are two types of forfeiture that have been identi-
fied: civil and criminal.1 6 Civil forfeiture operates in rem, or
against the property, while criminal forfeiture operates in per-
sonam, or against the person.1 7 Civil forfeiture has been used as
a penalty against the property regardless of the owner's culpabil-
ity ' because the property itself is deemed the wrongdoer.1 9
Thus, civil forfeiture is applied without great restrictions as a
means to remedy a wrong. 0 In comparison, prior to the passage
of RICO and CCE in 1970, criminal forfeiture had been effectu-
ated only in rare instances." For example, criminal forfeiture
had been employed as punishment against the person, but only
as a consequence of conviction." In fact, only once from 1790 to
1970 did congressional enactment permit such forfeiture. 3
15. The Old Testament makes the following reference to forfeiture: "if an ox gores a
man or a woman to death, then the ox shall surely be stoned . Exodus 21:28 (The
Jerusalem Bible).
16. Stone, Criminal Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO & CCE, 2 J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 546 (1986).
17. Id. at 546-47.
18. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974); United
States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1987).
19. Pearson, 416 U.S. at 683-86. This is illustrated by the forfeiture of a ship en-
gaged in piratical conduct where the innocence of the ship's owner was fully established.
United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844). The vessel was
treated as the offender without regard to the owner's conduct as it was the only adequate
means of suppressing the offense and insuring an indemnity to the injured party. Pear-
son, 416 U.S. at 684 (citing Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233). See also Stone,
supra note 16, at 549-51.
20. See Stone, supra note 16, at 551.
21. An in personam action is one which seeks judgment against a person as distin-
guished from a judgment against property. The government's right to property attaches
only "by the conviction of the offender." The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
22. The constitutionality of the confiscatory statutes which permitted recovery of
the life estates of Confederate soldiers was upheld by the Supreme Court in Bigelow v.
Forest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869) and Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268
(1870).
23. Confiscation Act, Ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862). Much of the traditional hostility
towards criminal forfeiture in the United States was due to the frequent employment of
the practice in England. The Framers of the Constitution demonstrated their repudia-
tion of this harsh English tradition by rejecting the notion of forfeiture for several possi-
3
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Hence, the principle underlying criminal forfeiture is clearly
punishment as compared with the remedial nature of its civil
counterpart.
B. Forfeiture Incorporated into the RICO and CCE Statutes
Not until 1970 was criminal forfeiture reintroduced into the
laws of the United States through its integration into the RICO
and CCE codifications.24 The purpose of these statutes was to
counter the pervasive effect that organized crime as an economic
enterprise was having on the national economy.25 Unlike tradi-
tional criminal forfeiture, RICO and CCE forfeitures do not
reach all of a defendant's property, rather they affect only that
property derived from his interest in the illicit enterprise.2 6
RICO and CCE provide for the imposition of strict fines and
sentences for violations, as well as for a mandatory forfeiture of
a defendant's property acquired through illegitimate activity. 7
These provisions were created to further the governmental inter-
est of combating crime by depriving criminal enterprises of their
economic bases. 28
The original RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions were only
ble reasons. See Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to
Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime?", 39 STAN L. REV.
663, 666 n.20 (1987). In particular, controversy over the effect of forfeiture on the de-
fendant's family and heirs resulted in the provision that "no Attainer of Treason shall
work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. The first Congress prohibited forfeiture of estate as a criminal
punishment upon conviction. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117. Thus,
forfeiture with an in personam application must be carefully assessed. United States v.
Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 962 (5th Cir. 1982)(Politz, J., dissenting).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). See also supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text for a discussion on the traditional doctrine of criminal forfeiture.
25. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-27 (1983).
26. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (D. Colo. 1985) (interest
involved enveloped the direct and indirect proceeds of racketeering).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988) (fines or imprisonment of not more than 20 years or
both); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988)("[a]ny person who engages in a continuing criminal en-
terprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20
years . . . up to life imprisonment, to a fine . . . [of] $2,000,000 . . . and to the forfeiture
prescribed in § 853 .... ").
28. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981). See also SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, S..
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
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meagerly successful due to a defendant's ability to transfer as-
sets prior to conviction, thereby avoiding forfeiture upon convic-
tion. 9 Congress subsequently amended these forfeiture provi-
sions by enacting the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.3o
C. The Extension of Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984
The CFA expanded the scope of RICO and CCE regarding
the type of property that is subject to forfeiture, the activity
that could result in forfeiture, and the property that the govern-
ment could freeze pursuant to a restraining order s.3  The amend-
29. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to
Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 765, 769 (1989).
30. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)).
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) which provides:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the
United States, irrespective of any provision of State law -
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; ...
(b) Meaning of term "property"
Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes -
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land;
and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, in-
terests, claims, and securities.
(c) Third party transfers
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this
section vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred
to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of
forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the
transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture
under this section.
(e) Protective orders
(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining
order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or
take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsec-
5
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ments were designed to "eliminate the statutory limitations and
tion (a) of this section for forfeiture under this section -(A) upon the filing of an
indictment or information charging a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II
of this chapter for which criminal forfeiture may be ordered under this section
and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in
the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section; or(B) prior to
the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to persons appear-
ing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the court
determines that -(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that the failure to enter the order will result
in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or
otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and (ii) the need to preserve the availa-
bility of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the
hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered:
Provided, however, That an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be
effective for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good
cause shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph
(A) has been filed.
(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon
application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when
an information or an indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the prop-
erty, if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that
the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of con-
viction, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice will
jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order
shall expire not more than ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless
extended for good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered
consents to an extension for a longer period. A hearing requested concerning an
order entered under this paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time and
prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
(3) The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant to this
subsection, evidence and information that would be admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
(n) Third party interests
(1) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the United
States shall publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the property
in such manner as the Attorney General may direct. The Government may also, to
the extent practicable, provide direct written notice to any person known to have
alleged an interest in the property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture as a
substitute for published notice as to those persons so notified.
(2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in prop-
erty which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this sec-
tion may, within thirty days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of
notice under paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to
adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be
held before the court alone, without a jury.
(o) Construction
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its re-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/11
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ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by
Federal law enforcement agencies."32 To accomplish this, Con-
gress borrowed a fiction of property law, the relation-back doc-
trine. This doctrine provides that property becomes tainted, and
thereby forfeitable, at the time of its illegal use.33 Pursuant to
the statutory language of the CFA, the government's interest in
the identified property vests when the illegal activity com-
mences."' Therefore, the government may seize property that
was possessed by the defendant dating back to the time of the
offense, not merely to the time of conviction, including property
transferred prior to conviction. 5 This prevents RICO defend-
ants from averting forfeiture by liquidating and dispersing their
assets prior to a conviction.3 6 Under this interpretation, the rela-
tion-back doctrine also allows the government to seize fees paid
to a defense attorney prior to a conviction because the govern-
ment's claim in the defendant's property predates the transfer
of the property to the attorney.
The CFA currently provides two avenues for an interested
third party, such as an attorney, to assert a valid claim to the
forfeitable property. First, an attorney may establish at a pre-
trial hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had a
legal interest in the property superior to the interest of the ac-
cused at the time of the actions giving rise to forfeiture.37 If he
successfully meets his evidentiary burden, an attorney may re-
tain any property legitimately transferred to him that would
otherwise be subject to a governmental claim under the CFA.3
medial purposes.
Id.
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 192.
33. Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role The-
ory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1, 19 ("The relation
back doctrine common to civil forfeiture proceedings provides that the target property
becomes tainted, and thus forfeitable, at the time of its illegal use.").
34. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). See Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Under RICO: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 124, 128 (1986) (authored by Lisa F. Rackner) ("The government's interest relates
back . . . and takes precedence over the interests subsequently obtained by third par-
ties."). See also Cloud, supra note 33, at 19.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
36. See Note, supra note 34, at 129.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
38. Id.
1990]
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Alternatively, an attorney may prevail by demonstrating, under
the same preponderance standard, that he was a "bona fide pur-
chaser for value" of the property and was, at the time of
purchase, "reasonably without cause to believe" that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture.39 Thus, assuming the accused had
retained an attorney after committing the alleged offense, the
attorney must advance evidence to show that he relied upon
facts gleaned from the defendant and was unaware of the forfei-
tability of the assets.4 0
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984
The federal courts have vacillated4 1 on the question of
whether the CFA must be read to include attorneys' fees, as the
government contends, or to exclude them on constitutional
grounds,' 2 as many defendants urge. The first court to address
39. 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1988).
40. If the attorney prevails, the court will amend the forfeiture order accordingly.
Arguably, the timing question regarding when the attorney learned of the assets origins
will be difficult to prove. Moreover, it presents ethical considerations that may make
substantiating this premise unwise. The "reasonably without cause to believe" standard
may conflict with ethical guidelines that an attorney must follow. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1)(6)
(1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (1988). See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7(b) (1987) and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A), EC 5-21
(1982). An attorney may not wish to fully develop the factual basis of a case if he learns
or is placed on notice that establishing certain facts may subject his fee to governmental
forfeiture. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
41. Compare In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637, 641 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) ("legislative history of the
CFA reveals no congressional intent that would require exemption of attorneys' fees
from the reach of the statute."); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (1988), aff'd on
other grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1989) (forfeiture statute did not exempt attor-
neys' fees); Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (fees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor
from forfeiture of the profits of illegal enterprises); United States v. Bailey, 666 F. Supp.
1275, 1277 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (the plain language of section 881 includes attorneys' fees
within its list of property subject to forfeiture); and United States v. Stein, 690 F. Supp.
767, 771 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (the unambiguous language of the statute does not provide an
exemption of attorneys' fees from forfeiture); with United States v. lanniello, 644 F.
Supp. 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (CFA was never intended to include attorneys' fees paid
for services rendered); and United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo.
1985) (attorneys' fees legitimately paid for services rendered are not subject to
forfeiture).
42, It may be suggested that Congress did intend to include attorneys' fees in the
provision, although not explicitly set forth, because most of the circuit court opinions
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/11
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the attorney fee forfeiture issue under the CFA was the District
Court of Colorado in United States v. Rogers."3 The Rogers
court concluded that the funds an attorney receives in return for
services legitimately rendered, and not part of a sham or artifice
to avoid forfeiture, were not subject to the statutory forfeiture
provisions."
In United States v. Ianniello,"5 the court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that the hastily enacted CFA
did not intend to subject legitimately earned legal fees to forfei-
ture.46 Similarly, in United States v. Badalamenti,47 the same
have harped on constitutional concerns, rather than on statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 640-48; Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1496-1505. The concur-
ring opinions of Chief Judge Feinberg and Judge Oakes in Monsanto examined the sixth
amendment infringement. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402-05 (2d Cir.
1988). See also United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Kiser, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th
Cir. 1988). Only Judge Winter's concurring opinion specifically articulated an argument
regarding the statutory interpretation of the CFA to exempt from forfeiture the fees of
defense attorneys and thereby circumvented the constitutional questions concerning fifth
and sixth amendment violations. Id. at 1405-11. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1405-11 (Winter,
J., concurring). The legislative history, coupled with the plain language of the statute,
and the fact that exceptions were made available to third parties to make claims against
the forfeitable property, indicates the expansive nature that the amendments were to
encompass. It appears that Congress intended not to resolve the conflict through this
legislation, but to leave the resolution to the courts. Payden v. United States, (In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum) 605 F. Supp. 839, 850 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). As a consequence of the precipitous enactment
of the statute, it can be inferred that Congress was aware of the constitutional implica-
tions and nevertheless promulgated the amendment. Irrespective of what Congress in-
tended to articulate in its hastily enacted amendment, the real question reduces to
whether this statute, as applied to attorneys' fees, is constitutional. United States v.
Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1556 (D. Utah 1987), rev'd, 841 F.2d 1485 (1988), aff'd on
other grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1989).
43. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
44. Id. at 1348. Four years prior to Rogers, the Third Circuit interpreted the "un-
amended" RICO statute to find that where the transfer of allegedly tainted assets was
clearly a sham, the transferred property could be subject to forfeiture. United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981). In Payden v. United States, the court suggested that
to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture would make lawyers mere conduits for the
laundering of racketeering profits. Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
45. 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
46. Id. at 455-56 (defendants charged with a 29 count violation of RICO, having had
their assets frozen pursuant to an ex parte restraining order sought and obtained by the
government, were not afforded a hearing to contest the government's right to restrain
those assets and therefore were permitted access to them in order to pay for the necessi-
ties of life).
47. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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district court suggested that the CFA's forfeiture provision may
only reach funds that the defendant intended to pay over to the
attorney; however, it may not be used to reach fees already paid
to the attorney in consideration of the defendant's representa-
tion in a RICO prosecution.48
Although early decisions in the district courts favored the
exemption from forfeiture of attorneys' fees for legitimately ren-
dered services," later district courts have decided otherwise.50 In
addition, several circuit courts have concluded that all attorneys'
fees must be subject to forefeiture simply from a plain reading
of the statute.51 In In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered,52 the en banc majority noted that the CFA
48. Id. at 198 (government may not rely on statutory forfeiture to support a sub-
poena duces tecum served upon a defense attorney as evidence to link his client to nar-
cotics trafficking).
49. See United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103 (N.D.W. Va. 1987) (defendant's
preconviction assignment of monies to counsel for legitimate attorneys' fees were not
subject to forfeiture); United States v. Madeoy, No. 86-0377 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1987)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library, 1987 WL 32) (where transaction was neither a sham nor
fraudulent, and where there were insufficient personal funds to retain counsel, release
from forfeiture order to pay trial level costs is appropriate); United States v. Figueroa,
645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (court can order payment of counsel fees to court-
appointed counsel from money that had been ordered forfeited); United States v. Es-
tevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1986), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3221 (1989) (court
permitted $40,000 to be excluded from forfeiture to be applied to defense attorneys'
fees); cf. United States v. Chinn, 687 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (defendant's interest
in assets obtained prior to the period covered by the indictment is not subject to forfei-
ture under § 1963). See also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
50. See United States v. Stein, 690 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (sixth amendment
does not provide a defendant with the right to demand that crime-related assets be kept
available to pay for privately retained counsel); United States v. Haro, 685 F. Supp.
1468, 1472-74 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (legislative history of § 853 reveals Congress' belief that
forfeiture would provide an effective weapon against the drug trade as it would combat
organized activity through the RICO statute). See also Payden v. United States (In.re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (subpoena seeking information regarding potential
forfeitable assets did not violate either defendant's fifth or sixth amendment rights).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1492-96 (1988), aff'd on other
grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1989). The Nichols court held that "Congress did not
specifically decide that attorneys' fees should be exempt from forfeiture, but that the
broad purposes of the amendments support forfeiture in as many instances as permissi-
ble." Id. at 1496; In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637, 641 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) ("legislative history of the
CFA reveals no congressional intent that would require exemption of the attorneys' fees
from the reach of the statute"). See also supra note 31 for statutory language.
52. 837 F.2d 637.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/11
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language is "unmistakenly clear and so plainly reaches property
used or intended to be used for attorneys' fees that the inquiry
should end without resort to legislative history."'53 The Caplin &
Drysdale court also indicated that although some courts have
applied the CFA only to sham transfers,5 4 this parsed applica-
tion would strip the bona fide purchaser requirement of any sub-
stantive meaning and effectively eliminate it from the statute.55
Similarly, in United States v. Nichols,5 the majority con-
tended that the language of the CFA did not exempt any attor-
neys' fees from forfeiture. The court found the language to be
clear: assets subject to forfeiture included any property obtained
as a result of the crime. Moreover, attorneys' fees were to be
treated no differently than other assets .5  The only limit to this
confiscatory power relates to the nexus of the property to the
illegal activity.59 Thus, how the defendant plans to use the prop-
erty is irrelevant to a forfeiture decision. 0
The Nichols court addressed the sham transfer concern by
focusing on two statements in the legislative history.6 1 This leg-
islative history was construed to deny relief to participants who
engage in sham transfers of property and to prevent defendants
from using third parties as conduits to avoid the forfeiture of
53. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 641 (citing United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d
905, 913-18 (1986)), revd en banc sub nor. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), afJ'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989)). The legislative history may not be
used to create an ambiguity where none exists; thus, the words of the statute are usually
the best indication of the legislative intent. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
55. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 642.
56. 841 F.2d 1485 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1989).
57. Id. at 1496.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1492.
60. Id. The CFA provisions "define forfeitable property without regard to its in-
tended or actual use, whether for payment to attorneys or for other uses." Id.
61. Id. at 1493. The first statement is: "The provision ... should be construed to
deny relief to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly
engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions." Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note
28, at 209 n.47).
The second statement is: "The purpose of the provision is to permit the voiding of
certain preconviction transfers and so close a potential loophole ... whereby the criminal
forfeiture sanction could be avoided by transfers that were not 'arms length' transac-
tions." Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 200-01).
1990]
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that property.2 Absent explicit and affirmative commands to
the contrary, the statutory language subjecting all property
which derived from illegal activity to forfeiture should be fol-
lowed.6 3 The Caplin & Drysdale and Nichols appellate deci-
sions, which reversed their earlier circuit court panel and district
court holdings, respectively, have strengthened the government's
position in its attempt to prevent RICO and CCE defendants
from transferring illegally obtained moneys to their attorneys
and thereby circumventing forfeiture. 4
E. Constitutional Considerations Regarding the Application
of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
Many of the federal courts that have confronted the attor-
ney fee forfeiture issue have concluded that the CFA must be
interpreted in a manner that will avoid constitutional friction.
These courts have, therefore, found that payments made to at-
torneys are exempt from forfeiture through a restrictive reading
of the statute.6 5 A contrary interpretation, it is suggested, would
infringe upon a defendant's sixth amendment right to retain
counsel and also deprive him of the fifth amendment right to a
fundamentally fair trial.6
Although early decisions held that fees must be exempt
from forfeiture to enable the defendant to obtain a fundamen-
tally fair trial, the more recent trend in the circuit courts has
been toward allowing the restraint of identified assets and their
subsequent forfeiture to stand. 7 For instance, the Caplin &
62. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1494.
63. Id.
64. See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
65. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court
concluded that the CFA would violate the sixth amendment by denying the defendant
the right to be assisted by counsel in a situation where he could afford to retain counsel.
Thus, the qualified right to obtain counsel of choice cannot be deprived absent a compel-
ling need to assure "prompt, effective and efficient administration of justice." Id. at 458
(quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1069 (1979)). The forfeiture of fees paid to a criminal defense attorney for legiti-
mately rendered legal services would result in an abridgment of such a right to counsel.
Id. See also United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
67. See United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v.
[Vol. 10:439
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Drysdale" court found attorneys' fees to be forfeitable since
their seizure posed no threat to the absolute right to representa-
tion by counsel.0 9 The court observed that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice is not absolute and must
yield to countervailing government concerns."
The Tenth Circuit similarly held in United States v. Nich-
ols 71 that failure to exempt attorneys' fees from the forfeiture of
the CFA provisions does not deny a defendant the right to coun-
sel since the defendant may use untainted assets to obtain coun-
sel or may have counsel appointed by the court if he is indi-
gent.72 The Nichols majority stated that the government does
not deny a defendant's right to counsel of choice when it acts
pursuant to a statutory procedure to protect its interest in assets
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th
Cir. 1988), af['d on other grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Forfeiture Hear-
ing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). But see
United States v. Kiser, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d
1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
68. 837 F.2d 637.
69. Id. at 643. The Nichols court suggested that the presumption of innocence did
not forbid interference with a defendant's property prior to a guilty verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Forfeiture, the court continued, was problematic in that it can
meddle with a defendant's property that is merely alleged to be illicit. Id. However, the
majority explained that "just as the government may restrain liberty to prevent the
flight of a suspect, it may restrain property to prevent the flight of forfeitable assets." Id.
(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)). The majority stated that these defend-
ants may be required to rely on appointed counsel if they do not possess sufficient un-
contested funds to hire a private defense attorney. Id. The court suggested that if this
were not so, the government would be unable to prosecute defendants who possessed no
funds for fear of violating the defendants' constitutional rights. Id. at 646-47.
70. Id. at 645-46.
71. 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.
1989).
72. Id. Specifically, the Nichols court balanced various factors and hardships, "in-
cluding the government's interest in the efficient administration of the trial and the de-
fendant's interest in preserving chosen counsel" in determining whether a forfeiture or-
der was proper. Id. at 1504. The majority advanced the theory that as long as the
forfeiture order is not issued in an arbitrary manner, a court may restrict a defendant's
choice of counsel if permitting the representation by a particular attorney would "ad-
versely affect an important public interest." Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 699
F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983)). See also Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692-93 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983). The Nichols court stated that the standard of arbitrar-
iness is merely the threshold inquiry and then concluded that reliance on a grand jury
indictment to issue a restraining order does not amount to an arbitrary act. Nichols, 841
F.2d at 1504-05. See also United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir. 1986).
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possessed by the accused.73
In United States v. Friedman,7 4 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit found, in a per curiam opinion,
that the defendant was not entitled to the release of forfeited
assets to allow for the retention of counsel of choice for the an-
ticipated appeal from the judgment of conviction. 75 The court
held that the right to counsel of choice is qualified and not abso-
lute 76 and emphasized that upon his conviction, the assets which
defendant sought to recover were no longer his own.77
73. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1494. Despite the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Logan
that warned against becoming "carried away by ... [the] emotional revulsion" to these
crimes when deciding constitutional issues, application for a rehearing en banc was de-
nied. Id. at 1509 (Logan, J., dissenting).
74. 849 F.2d 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
75. Friedman did not rely on a statutory interpretation to allow for the release of
assets, nor did he rely on the validity of the forfeiture order. Rather, the defendant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision regarding the infringement of his
right to counsel. Id. at 1489.
76. Id. at 1490. Criminal defendants who are financially able to retain counsel
merely have a qualified right to do so. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161 (1988).
This right is circumscribed by the advocate being a member of the bar, affordable to his
client, willing to accept the representation of the defendant, and not having a previous or
ongoing relationship with an opposing party. Id.
77. Id. at 1491. The court qualified its holding by stating that it expressed no view
regarding cases arising from a defendant seeking to free restrained assets prior to a con-
viction pursuant to the CFA. Id. In such cases "it is not entirely clear who owns the
property." Id.
Moreover, in United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part
while finding that defendants' sixth amendment right to counsel was not violated by the
issuance of a restraining order freezing their tainted assets. Id. at 724-25. However, to
the extent that such an order interfered with the ability to retain counsel and the Justice
Department failed to demonstrate the basis for its assertion relating to forfeitable assets
coupled with the court not releasing sufficient funds to pay for counsel, defendants' fifth
amendment due process arguments were well received due to the potential for
prosecutorial abuse. Id. at 725-30. The court stressed, however, the "very limited degree
to which [they found] the present statutory scheme constitutionally infirm." Id. at 730.
Only where a defendant presents a bona fide need to utilize assets subject to the re-
straining order to maintain their defense to accused offenses will assets be released for
that specific purpose. Id.
In the latest case prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in this arena, the
Eleventh Circuit announced in United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989),
that the pre-trial restraint of all of the defendant's assets upon the finding by the district
court judge of a probable cause to believe that the assets had been derived from drug
trafficking did not violate the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights. Id. at 1351,
1356.
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In United States v. Thier,75 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals never reached the issue of the constitutionality of attorney
fee forfeiture, but held that the procedures employed when issu-
ing a restraining order must comport with minimum due process
requirementsa.7  The fifth amendment right to due process of law
demands that notice and an adversarial hearing be provided
before depriving an individual of the right to use these assets in
securing an attorney to defend him against criminal charges.8 0
78. 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 1467. The majority cited a Ninth Circuit decision which held the CCE to
be "unconstitutional on its face because Congress failed to provide for a hearing on a
restraining order before trial or conviction." Id. (quoting United States v. Crozier, 777
F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985)). The Crozier court found that Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure controlled the restraining order in the absence of valid proce-
dural guidelines. Id. at 1382. Thus, without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard at an adversarial hearing, the deprivation of property pursuant to the CFA vio-
lated defendant's fifth amendment right to due process of the law. Id. at 1383-84.
80. Thier, 801 F.2d at 1468. The court found that the statute "does not on its face
or by necessary implication bar minimum due process protections." Id. Congress in-
tended the indictment to be sufficient notice of the government's plan to seek forfeiture.
However, the language of Section 853 does not expressly or impliedly negate the applica-
tion of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies to the issuance of
all ex parte restraining orders by the federal courts of the United States. The court bal-
anced the defendant's interest in having access to funds to pay ordinary and necessary
living expenses and attorneys' fees against the government's interest in preventing the
depletion of potentially forfeitable assets. Id. at 1474-75. Unless the record clearly indi-
cates the government's compelling need to seek forfeiture, the balance of hardships must
shift substantially when the government desires to freeze assets needed to provide coun-
sel and sustenance to himself and his family. Id. at 1476 (Rubin, J., concurring). Attor-
neys' knowledge of charges against their clients does not ipso facto disqualify their claim
as bona fide purchasers without notice of the alleged origins of the property. Id.
In United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, reh'g en banc granted, 844 F.2d 215
(1988), rev'd, 877 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1989) (the Fifth Circuit reversed as a result of Cap-
lin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989), and United States v. Monsanto,
109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989) without reaching the merits, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the prin-
ciple it announced in Thier. The first Jones court followed its earlier ruling in Thier to
find that neither a plain reading of the statute nor an examination of the legislative
history ipso facto disqualifies the attorney's claim as a bona fide purchaser for services
rendered. Jones, 837 F.2d at 1334.
The Eighth Circuit found, in United States v. Kiser, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 890 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1989) (the Eighth Circuit reversed as a result of Caplin &
Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989), and United States v. Monsanto, 109 S.
Ct. 2657 (1989) without reaching the merits) that where the seizure warrants were issued
two months prior to the actual arrest, the Justice Department had offended the defend-
ant's fifth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to counsel.
853 F.2d at 1449. The court found that depriving the defendant of the ability to use his
assets to secure counsel solely on the basis of the government's allegations and a magis-
trate's ex parte finding of probable cause to believe his assets forfeitable compromised
15
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Although many of the circuit courts have held that attorney
fee forfeiture is permissible, ' a fragmented Second Circuit
adopted an opposite view."2 In addition, the decisions in the cir-
cuit courts favoring forfeiture have been closely split. This dis-
sension within each of the circuit courts made the question ripe
for Supreme Court analysis. The Supreme Court chose to ad-
dress the issue in the case of United States v. Monsanto.83
III. United States v. Monsanto
A. Factual History
On July 8, 1987, Peter Monsanto was charged with eight
counts of violating the RICO and CCE statutes by allegedly di-
recting a heroin distribution enterprise." In its federal indict-
ment, the government identified the property which was subject
to the forfeiture provision of the CFA: a home in Mount Vernon,
New York worth $335,000; a cooperative apartment in Bronx,
New York, worth $30,000; and $35,000 in cash. 5 A restraining
order was entered immediately after the indictment.8 That or-
der prevented Monsanto from transferring to a third party or
encumbering any of the assets that were allegedly linked to
criminal activities. 7
On August 21, 1987, defense counsel filed a motion to vacate
or modify the restraining order to permit Monsanto to use the
his constitutional guarantees. Id. at 1450. The procedural posture was, however, unlike
those of other appellate cases which have considered the validity of the forfeiture orders
available under the CFA. Id. at 1448. Kiser dealt with the particular application of the
statute, not with its facial constitutionality, whereas most cases have surfaced after the
government had granted or denied a restraining order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)
which prevented the defendant from disposing of the allegedly forfeitable property. Id.
81. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
82. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d
Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
83. 109 S. Ct. 363 (1989). See infra notes 84-98 and 127-195 and accompanying text.
84. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d
1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
85. Id. at 76.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 75-76. Even with Criminal Justice Act (CJA) level compensation, none of
the attorneys contacted by Monsanto was interested in representing him. Id. at 77. See
18 U.S.C. §3006A(d) (1988).
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restrained assets to retain private trial counsel, and to exempt
legal fees paid to counsel from post-trial forfeiture. 8 The dis-
trict court judge refused to grant the motion, but certified it for
immediate review by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit. 9 The circuit court panel rendered its decision on December
21, 1987, refusing to modify the order and finding that legiti-
mate attorneys' fees were not exempt from the statutory lan-
guage.90 The court contended, however, that forfeitable assets
could be invaded for the purposes of paying attorneys' fees at
the rates prescribed by the Criminal Justice Act (CJA). 1 Fur-
ther, the court found that an insufficient opportunity for an ad-
versarial hearing existed.92 Thus, the court held that without
such notice and the opportunity to contest the restraint of as-
sets, the restraining order did not comport with the defendant's
fifth amendment right to due process of law.9 3 The panel re-
manded the case to the district court to establish a hearing pro-
cedure where the defendant would have an opportunity to con-
test the government's contention that the property was
forfeitable.94
An adversarial hearing was subsequently held, and the as-
sets were deemed subject to forfeiture.9 Simultaneous with this
hearing, defendant appealed to the court for a rehearing en
banc9 On March 30, 1988, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
heard oral arguments from the defendant, the government, and
several amici curiae. The full court took the matter under ad-
88. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 76.
89. Id. at 76-77.
90. Id. at 85.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1988). The rates prescribed by the CJA are $60.00 per
hour, or $75.00 per hour under justifiable circumstances, for in-court time, and $40.00
per hour otherwise up to a maximum of $3,000. Id.
92. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 83-85.
93. Id. at 85.
94. Id.
95. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd,
109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
96. Id. at 1401-02.
'97. Id. at 1400-01. Briefs were filed on appellant's behalf by the New York Counsel
of Defense Lawyers, New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, New
York Criminal Bar Association, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
Committee on Criminal Advocacy, the Committee on Criminal Law, the New York City
Deputy Attorney General for Medicaid Fraud Control, the National Association of Crim-
1990]
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visement and issued its decision on July 30, 1988.98
B. The Second Circuit Opinion
The en banc decision of the Second Circuit"9 discusses many
of the issues addressed by the other circuits and represents, in
effect, a microcosm of the views of the remaining circuits. In-
deed, the division among the Monsanto judges, which resulted
in a varied combination of votes in four concurring opinions, is
indicative of the confusion and disagreement regarding attorney
fee forfeiture.
1. Statutory Interpretation
Judge Winter, joined by Judges Meskill and Newman, fo-
cused on the permissiveness of the statutory language. °00 In an
effort to rescue the CFA from constitutional scrutiny and its
possible invalidation, Judge Winter argued that the permissive
word "may" rather than the mandatory term "shall" vests dis-
trict court judges with great discretionary power."' He stated
that the exercise of such discretion is to be performed with ref-
erence to the traditional equitable principles that balance the
relative hardships to the parties. He further argued that estab-
inal Defense Lawyers, the National Network for the Right to Counsel and the New York
Civil Liberties Union. Id.
98. Id.
99. 852 F.2d 1400. In addition to the Second Circuit opinions discussed below,
Judge Miner was joined by Judge Altimari in a short concurring opinion which reasoned
that the restraining order should be vacated in order to permit Monsanto access to the
assets restrained by the government's order to the extent necessary to pay legitimate
attorneys' fees for his defense. Id. at 1411-12 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). In an opinion authored by Judge Pierce, Judge Cardamone joined in finding
that the statute authorized postindictment restraint of assets that would otherwise be
utilized for retaining counsel. Id. at 1418 (Pierce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Pratt drafted a separate opinion in which he argued that the predominant
function of the sixth amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for a criminal
defendant, not to ensure that the defendant will be represented by the lawyer he prefers.
Id. at 1420 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697
(1988)) (Pratt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
101. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring) ("Because of the 'may'
language and the lack of any evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, I read the
Act to vest district courts with a discretionary power to restrain assets identified in an
indictment as subject to forfeiture.").
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lished canons of statutory interpretation favor the retention of a
court's full equitable powers absent a clear statement by the leg-
islature to effect a contrary purposeful result.1"2 Thus, in view of
the many theories of statutory interpretation, 10 3 it is conceivable
to declare the CFA to exempt defense attorneys' fees from
forfeiture.
The Monsanto dissent, authored by Judge Mahoney at-
tacked the rationale of the four concurrences by arguing that
any transfer of property subject to a restraining order frustrates
the statutory purpose'0 of preventing the dissipation of identi-
fied assets upon conviction. 05 In another dissenting opinion,
Judge Cardamone urged that the permissive "may" in the stat-
ute' should be construed "sensibly to allow for certain inva-
sions into otherwise restrainable assets. ' 10 7 This reading of the
congressional purpose of criminal forfeiture coupled with the
progressive goals of the RICO and CCE statutes, 08 Judge Maho-
102. Id. "The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be
yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction." Id. at 1406 (quoting Brown v.
Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 496, 503 (1836)). Judge Winter commented on the permissive-
ness of the statutory language and questioned why many courts have routinely author-
ized the most "draconian of restraints on a defendant's assets" without pondering the
hardship it imposes. Id. at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring).
103. The well-recognized canon of construction concerning the rule of lenity in crim-
inal proceedings warns that if the statute does not clearly outlaw private conduct, the
private actor cannot be penalized; for the punishment deprives the defendant of his per-
sonal liberty and freedom. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 658 (1988'). Additionally, where two possible interpretations
of a statute exist, the statute must be construed in such a manner to avoid a constitu-
tional friction. Id. at 676. See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)
(where the statutory language is unambiguous, that language must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive in absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary).
104. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1413 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). The legislative history
indicates that the 1984 amendments were "designed to enhance the use of [criminal]
forfeiture ... as a law enforcement tool" to effectuate the 1970 Act's objective. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 191. The overall statutory purpose is to "preserve the availa-
bility of a defendant's assets for criminal forfeiture and, in those cases in which he does
transfer, deplete, or conceal his property, to assure that he cannot [do so in order to]
avoid the economic impact." Id. at 196.
105. "The sole purpose of the bill's restraining order provision ... is to preserve the
...availability of the property pending disposition of the criminal case." SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 28, at 204.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988).
107. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1419 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
108. The intent of the congressional draftsmen was to remove the economic founda-
tions and incentives from enterprising criminal activities by the promulgation of the
19
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ney argued, leads to the conclusion that the spirit of the CFA
did not intend to provide an exemption for defense attorneys'
fees.109
2. Constitutional Analysis
In addition to the per curiam opinion, a plurality of the
court grounded the decision in the sixth amendment right to
counsel and ruled that Monsanto should be permitted access to
the restrained assets to the extent necessary to pay legitimate
attorneys' fees in connection with the criminal charges he
confronted. 1 0
a. The Concurring Opinions
Chief Judge Feinberg filed a concurring opinion which
stated that the CFA forfeiture provisions were violative of the
sixth amendment to the extent that they prevented RICO and
CCE defendants from securing counsel of choice."' Further, he
expressed a concern that the hearing which was envisioned by
the original three member panel would not "overcome the con-
stitutional infirmities."1 '
Chief Judge Feinberg maintained that the right to counsel
of choice cannot be infringed absent a compelling governmental
interest ' 3 and that the interest in the instant case was not
CFA. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-28 (1983).
109. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1415 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Id. The initial Second Circuit Monsanto opinion set in place a post-restraining
order adversarial hearing to ascertain the status of the assets identified in the forfeiture-
related restraining orders. This hearing was established in the same vein as Rule 65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hearing requirement. Where such a hearing is af-
forded, the continued restraining order does not conflict with the accused's constitu-
tional right to due process of the law. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 76, 83 (2d
Cir. 1987).
In the panel opinion, Judge Oakes observed the Supreme Court's resistance to the
implementation of mini-trials and thus, cautioned the creation of this new procedural
step. Id. (Oakes, J., dissenting). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78
(1974).
113. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). This sixth amend-
ment guarantee is a fundamental right that is a key element in our criminal justice sys-
tem. Id. However, the application of the CFA to defendants, like Monsanto, nearly de-
stroys this security by depriving them of the funds to retain their choice of attorney
[Vol. 10:439
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"overwhelmingly persuasive.""' The Chief Judge argued that al-
though the government has a legitimate interest in the property
subject to forefeiture, this interest is not as formidable as a de-
fendant's when no other assets are available to secure counsel to
mount a defense to the criminal charges faced.11 5 Moreover, he
suggested that the government could seek to control, and conse-
quently weaken, the ability of an accused to defend himself at a
RICO or CCE prosecution. " 6 Permitting the government to con-
trol who its opposing counsel will be by limiting the pool of
available defense counsel creates a potential risk to the adver-
sarial system that offends the constitutional notions of funda-
mental fairness.
Judge Oakes (now Chief Judge), " 7 also in a concurring
opinion, argued that the sixth amendment may be implicated
not only on the individual basis of a particular defendant's right
to the counsel of his choice, but also on an institutional level of
the criminal justice system in its entirety. " He further stated
that to permit prosecutors to undermine the quality of the de-
fendant's counsel in the precise type of complex matter where
astute, experienced defense attorneys are most sought, is to con-
done the abridgment of these constitutionally secured
guarantees. " 9
prior to the trial's commencement. Id. The purported interest of the government, Fein-
burg argued, merely relates to the possible dissipation of the identified assets in the
relatively brief period from indictment to possible conviction. Id. In addition, he con-
tended, the government sought to prevent alleged criminals from using their economic
power obtained through possibly illegal activities. Id.
114. Id. The government's claim, which is only conditional for ownership interests
of the specified assets, is not determined until the outcome of the criminal proceeding.
Id. at 1402-03.
115. Id. at 1403.
116. Id. This interest, Chief Judge Feinberg urged, is "not a legitimate government
interest." Id.
117. Id. at 1404 (Oakes, J., concurring).
118. Id.
119. Id. The institutional interests of a fair adversarial system, Judge Oakes argued,
must be considered when possibly granting the government unbridled discretion respect-
ing an unwholesome "power over the defendant's choice of counsel" in RICO and CCE
litigation. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 86 (2d Cir. 1987)(Oakes, J.,
dissenting).
Further, Judge Oakes elaborated, the sixth amendment right to counsel is not res-
cued by the proposed pre-trial hearing for several reasons, which he had given in his
earlier Monsanto decision. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1404 (2d Cir. 1988)
1990]
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Judge Oakes echoed Chief Judge Feinberg's concern regard-
ing ethical dilemmas: "The forfeiture provisions infect the sys-
tem with . . . unavoidable conflicts of interest . . . for the de-
fense attorney that jeopardizes the right to due process."1 20 In
addition, he argued, pretrial forfeiture coupled with pretrial de-
tention is too similar to the "Alice-in-Wonderland Queen's 'sen-
tence first, verdict afterward' mode of justice.""12
b. Judge Mahoney's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Mahoney's dissenting opinion stressed that the ad-
versarial hearing requirement implemented by the Monsanto
panel majority,"' which merely attached a forfeiture order to
the indictment, would provide the requisite procedural check
against broad and uncurtailed governmental discretion with re-
(citing Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 85)(Oakes, J., concurring). In his earlier analysis, Judge
Oakes first asked, who will represent the defendant at this hearing? Monsanto, 836 F.2d
at 86-87. Second, he suggested, the pre-trial hearing will do little to protect the interests
of the defendant or the adversarial system. Id. at 87. Absent vigorous cross-examination
or the production of evidence to establish the legitimacy of the property's origins, the
government will have little trouble meeting its burden of showing its likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits. Id.
120. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1404 (Oakes, J., concurring). See United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Badalamenti, Judge Leval
framed the ethical concern most appropriately:
A lawyer who was so foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealistic as to take the busi-
ness would find himself in inevitable positions of conflict. His obligation to be well
informed on the subject of his client's case would conflict with his interest in not
learning facts that would endanger his fee by telling him his fee was the proceeds
of illegal activity. If he made efforts to fight the forfeiture claiming he was "rea-
sonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture," the
evidence on this issue would consist primarily of privileged matter confided to him
by his client. He might furthermore be found to have accepted a contingent fee in
a criminal case in violation of DR 2-106(C), since his retention of his fee would
depend on gaining an acquittal in the client's trial. The statute would give attor-
neys a motive to negotiate a guilty plea that did not involve forfeiture, rather than
to fight the case thereby expending valuable time and increasing the risk of incur-
ring forfeiture.
Id.
121. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1404. Judge Oakes concluded his opinion by emphasiz-
ing that a statutory scheme that denies a defendant his right to counsel of choice, that
compromises the attorney-client relationship, that permits the government to undermine
the adversarial process, and that punishes prior to the trial on the merits "cannot and
must not survive Constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 1405.
122. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 84-85.
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gard to limiting RICO and CCE defendants' choice of counsel.'
If the government failed to, show the probable likelihood that a
jury would find the identified assets to be proceeds of the crimi-
nal activity and thus forfeitable, then the defendant's interest in
using the property would prevail.'24 If, however, the government
met its burden through a sufficient showing to justify restraint,
then the defendant would have no sixth amendment right to ex-
emption of property sought to be applied to defense counsel.2 5
In the event that the defendant does not prevail at the hearing,
he still may be represented by court-appointed counsel."2 '
C. Monsanto in the Supreme Court
On November 7, 1988, the United States Supreme Court
granted the government's petition for a writ of certiorari'27 to
123. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1415 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 84-85).
125. Id. Judge Mahoney likened the latter scenario to the situation where a defend-
ant is refused access to contraband where a third party has a clear possessory interest.
Id. at 85. He argued that no constitutional principle existed that permitted a defendant
to pay private counsel from the proceeds of criminal activity. Id.
126. Id. Defendants with this status, he argued, should not be placed in a position
superior to that of an indigent defendant without such property at his disposal. Id. In
essence, Judge Mahoney's views were similar to the notions espoused by the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits. For example, his discussion was similar to that of the Caplin & Drysdale
Fourth Circuit majority:
We . . . decline . . . to accord this class of criminal defendants a unique and fa-
vored constitutional status. Such a rule would constitutionally prefer the drug
merchant with none but illicit assets not only to indigent defendants but to de-
fendants with untainted assets, who must sacrifice them to secure the counsel of
their choice.
In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 646 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
Or as the Tenth Circuit majority put it in United States v. Nichols:
It is hard to conceive of a legal system in which appointed counsel is routinely
adequate in a death penalty case, but is somehow inadequate in a case involving
"the career criminal millionaire who purchases cars, businesses, and real estate
with cash delivered to banks in suitcases."
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1507 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d
825 (10th Cir. 1989).
127. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1989). Another petition, by the law
firm of Caplin & Drysdale, for review of a Fourth Circuit decision that dealt with the
application of the same CFA forfeiture provisions under a similar factual setting, was
granted on the same day. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 363
(1989). The Court heard the two cases in tandem. Id.
Caplin & Drysdale, although factually similar to Monsanto, differed from Monsanto
23
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hear arguments with respect to the Second Circuit's Monsanto
decision.12 The Supreme Court resolved several years of confu-
sion and turmoil among the circuit courts throughout the
nation by issuing its opinion on June 22, 1989.129 The slim five-
to-four majority handed the Justice Department a major victory
in its efforts to counter the vast spread of criminal racketeering
and illegal activity in our society, particularly with respect to
drug traffickers.
1. Justice White's Majority Opinion
Justice White, writing for the majority, 130 framed the ques-
tion in terms of whether the federal drug forfeiture statute per-
mitted pretrial restraint of assets possessed by the defendant,
even when the defendant sought to use the assets to retain de-
fense counsel. 3 1 If the answer to this inquiry was yes, then the
Court had to focus on whether this restraint was constitutionally
permitted. 132
because it involved petitioners that did not have a direct stake in the outcome. In re
Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), aff'd sub nor. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989). Because the petitioners Caplin & Drysdale were third parties, the Fourth Circuit,
in its earlier decision, had ruled for the government. Id. The Court found Caplin & Drys-
dale to have jus tertii standing due to their assertion of a direct and palpable injury
sufficient to satisfy the article III case or controversy requirement as a result of the gov-
ernment subjecting their client's assets to forfeiture. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2651 n.3 (1989). The Caplin & Drysdale law firm stood to
lose, and eventually did lose, over $170,000 in legal fees incurred in connection with their
representation of Christopher Reckmeyer in defense of his CCE charges for drug traffick-
ing. Id. The judicially created prudential concerns were satisfied upon examination of
three factors: the relationship of the litigant to the person whose rights are being as-
serted; the ability of the person to advance his own rights; and the impact of the litiga-
tion on third party rights. Id. The first and third factors were found by the Court to
weigh in favor of Caplin & Drysdale. The attorney-client relationship, the Court de-
clared, like the doctor-patient relationship, "is one of special consequences." Id.
128. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
129. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
130. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined Justice White's opinion. Id. at 2659.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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a. Statutory Question
Justice White began his discussion of the forfeiture statute
by illustrating the meaning and the breadth of the statutory lan-
guage.133 He stated that "[i]n determining the scope of a statute,
we look first to its language.""13 He continued his analysis by
remarking that section 853 is plain and unambiguous; that is, no
exceptions are set forth for assets to be used to pay attorneys'
fees.135 Therefore, he urged, all assets that fall within the stat-
ute's scope are to be forfeited. 3 '
Justice White quickly disposed of Monsanto's argument
concerning the silence of the legislative history of the statute
with respect to the attorney fee forfeiture question and the need
for the Court to create such an exemption. 137 He argued that the
legislative silence was meaningless because the legislative history
and congressional debates were similarly silent on the "use of
forfeitable assets to pay stockbroker's fees, laundry bills, or
country club memberships.' 1 38 He emphasized the fact that the
forfeiture provision could be used to attach these assets without
an express provision " 'does not demonstrate ambiguity'
[rather] '[i]t demonstrates breadth.' 91139
Justice White also remarked that when Congress adopted
the CFA, 4 ° it also provided for the special forfeiture of collat-
eral profits that a convicted defendant accrues from his
crimes.' 4 This provision, however, expressly permits exemption
of money for a defendant's legal representation in matters re-
lated to the offense for which the defendant was convicted. 142
133. Id. at 2662.
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2662-63.
139. Id. at 2663 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)
(quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398
(7th Cir. 1984))).
140. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (codified
as added and amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)).
141. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664 (citing Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 2175-2176 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 (1988))).
142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 (1988). That is, the government is permitted to purge
up to 20% of the total profits reaped from contractual rights in books, movies, or other
saleable items made derivatively as a result of the defendant's crime. 18 U.S.C. §
1990]
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This express statement, Justice White suggested, indicated that
Congress was aware of its actions when no like statement was
placed in the text of the CFA. 14 1
Justice White viewed the "equitable discretion" of the court
under section 853(e)(1)(A) very conservatively. That section per-
mits the issuance of a restraining order to preserve the availabil-
ity of property that has been identified by the Justice Depart-
ment as forfeitable.1 4 Justice White noted, however, that this
"equitable discretion" given the court is actually "no discretion
at all" with respect to the issues under review.1' 5 He argued that
the discretion of the court must be "cabined" by the purposes
for which Congress created the statute."4 That is, in view of the
relation-back provision of section 853(c) 14 7 and the comprehen-
sive "any property . . . any proceeds" language of section
853(a), 48 it is inconceivable that Congress would nullify the ef-
fectiveness of these provisions by allowing the court in its discre-
tion to return the questioned property to the defendant's
possession."19
b. Constitutional Analysis
Having concluded that asset forfeiture was neither exempt
from the statute nor to be utilized at the court's discretion, Jus-
tice White considered the constitutionality of the concerns that
were raised for review. 15 Relying primarily on the Caplin &
Drysdale' decision, which was issued by the Court on the same
day, Justice White disposed of the fifth and sixth amendment
arguments by succinctly holding that the Constitution does not
require that Congress permit a defendant to use assets adjudged
3681(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
143. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
144. Id. It was on this framework that Judge Winter concurred with the per curiarn
opinion below. Id. (citing United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1405-11 (2d Cir.
1988)(en banc)(Winter, J., concurring)).
145. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
146. Id.
147. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
148. Id.
149. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
150. Id.
151. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
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to be forfeitable to pay that defendant's legal expenses. 152
In conclusion, Justice White addressed the concern that dis-
tinct constitutional rights were being impinged by freezing as-
sets before a final judgment was rendered with respect to their
forfeitability.' 53 He dismissed this notion by concluding that it
would be peculiar for the government to be unable to restrain
property held by the defendant, based on a finding of probable
cause, when the Court has found that the government may re-
strain a person where there is a finding of probable cause to be-
lieve he has committed a serious offense.
54
2. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens, prefaced his dissent by establishing a commonality
among the "jurists who have held forth" against the majority's
interpretation of this statute. 155 He found it "unseemly and un-
just . . .for the Government to beggar those [whom] it prose-
cutes" thereby effectively crippling their ability to mount a de-
fense at trial.'56
The "trivializ[ation]" of the burden placed on a RICO or
CCE defendant with respect to the forfeiture law is certainly un-
warranted. 57 Justice Blackmun contended that the majority
should pay "heed to the warnings" sounded by the district
courts who have much greater exposure to these situations than
any appellate judge.'5 s This will enable the majority to better
grasp the devastating effects that the forfeiture provisions have
on these defendants and ensure the "integrity of ... [the] adver-
sarial system of justice [as a whole].' 59
152. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2666.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
155. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989) (because these cases were
heard in tandem, Justice Blackmun's consolidated dissent is reported separately).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
1990]
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
a. Statutory Interpretation
Justice Blackmun remarked in his analysis, as did Justice
White in his majority opinion,' that the statute was clearly and
obviously silent on the issue of attorney fee exemption from for-
feiture. 1' However, Justice Blackmun quickly dismissed the ma-
jority's reference to stockbroker's fees, laundry expenses, and
country club dues by stating that "one cannot believe that Con-
gress was unaware that interference with the payment of attor-
neys' fees, unlike interference with these other [mundane] ex-
penditures, would [certainly] raise sixth amendment
concerns."'
62
A review of the legislative history and congressional hear-
ings surrounding the CFA's promulgation "demonstrates that
the Act does not seek forfeiture of property for its own sake
merely to maximize the amount of money the government col-
lects."' 63 Rather, he continued, the "central purposes of the Act
. . . are fully served by an approach to forfeiture that leaves am-
ple room for the exercise of statutory discretion."'6 4
Justice Blackmun reiterated that the founding purposes of
the CFA are to "prevent the profits of criminal activity from be-
ing poured into future such activity, for 'it is through economic
power that [criminal activity] is sustained and grows.' ",166 The
drafters of the statute recognized, according to Justice Black-
mun, that for the laws addressing organized crime and illegal
drugs to have meaning, the economic power bases which support
racketeers, mobsters, and drug dealers would have to be diluted
in order to give convictions meaning and increase the effective-
ness of the CFA. 6 6 Thus, he continued, a district court operates
within its discretionary boundaries that have been delineated by
the statute's framework when it exempts assets that a defendant
needs to retain counsel of choice from preconviction restraint
160. Id. at 2662.
161. Id. at 2668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
163. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2670.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 191) (alteration in original).
166. Id. at 2670-71.
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and postconviction forfeiture. 167 The government does not have
the power, Justice Blackmun urged, to punish the defendant
before conviction.168 Moreover, no important and legitimate gov-
ernmental interest is served by permitting such a result.6 9 Fur-
ther, he concluded, this power is not one that was contemplated
by the drafters of the forfeiture provisions of the CFA.171
b. Constitutional Questions
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's rationale for the
resulting decision which was based on a constitutional question
that it could have avoided.1 71 Justice Blackmun argued that con-
struing the statute to give effect to its plain meaning and legisla-
tive purpose would circumvent any constitutional conflicts and
preserve the statute.17 Thus, the prudentially preferable con-
struction of the CFA is also the one that gives full effect to the
discretionary language of section 853.173
Justice Blackmun again criticized the majority for moving
rapidly from its proposition that "a defendant may not insist on
representation by an attorney he cannot afford' 1 74 to the end
result that "the Government is free to deem the defendant indi-
gent by declaring his assets 'tainted' by criminal activity the
Government has yet to prove. "175
While court-appointed counsel is critical to assuring the
fairness of criminal trials, "it has never defined the outer limits
of the Sixth Amendment demands.' 1 7 He argued that the ma-
jority seemed to have forgotten the "distinct role" that the sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice plays in "protecting the
integrity of the judicial process.' 77 The right to retained counsel
of choice, Justice Blackmun continued, "serves to foster the
167. Id. at 2671.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2671-72.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2672 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161 (1988)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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trust between attorney and client that is necessary for the attor-
ney to be a truly effective advocate. 178 The ensuing relationship
governs the crucial decisions with respect to the defendant's lib-
erty that has been placed in the hands of counsel,179 but the de-
fendant's perception of the judicial process and his willingness
to accept its results, "depend upon his confidence in his coun-
sel's dedication, loyalty, and ability.' ' 80
In addition, Justice Blackmun argued, the right to retain
private counsel serves to "assure some modicum of equality be-
tween the Government and those it chooses to prosecute.''8
Further, the right to privately retained and compensated coun-
sel also serves broader institutional goals.'82 That is, the "virtual
socialization of criminal defense work" in the United States
would likely result if widespread abandonment of the right to
retain chosen counsel was to occur concurrently with the stand-
ardization of criminal defense services.1 3 Thus, a place exists in
this system for the "maverick and the risk taker, for approaches
that might not fit into the structured environment of a public
defender's office, or that might displease a judge whose prefer-
ence for nonconfrontational styles of advocacy might influence
the judge's appointment decisions.' 8 4 Similarly, there exists a
distinct place for "specialized defense counsel" who possess a
certain prowess to direct technical and complex criminal litiga-
tion, such as RICO or CCE defenses. 85 Therefore, Justice Black-
mun contended, only a healthy and independent defense bar can
possibly be expected to meet the demands placed on it by indi-
vidual defendants passing through our criminal justice system.8 6
If Congress' aim had been to undermine the adversary sys-
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
180. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2673 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting Brief for Amici Curiae Committees on Criminal Advocacy and
Criminal Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York at 9, United States v.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989)(No. 88-454)).
184. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2674 (quoting Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1973)).
185. Id., at 2674.
186. Id.
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tem, then, Justice Blackmun fervently argued, attorney fee for-
feiture would be the ideal "engine of destruction. ' 187 With the
prospect of pretrial restraint of defendant's assets, private coun-
sel will be unwilling or unable to continue or take on the de-
fense.1 88 Even without the issuance of a restraining order, Jus-
tice Blackmun contended that the possibility of governmental
seizure of the forfeitable assets after conviction will itself sub-
stantially decrease the likelihood of retaining private counsel.1"9
The relationship between an attorney appointed by the
court and his client will likely begin in distrust and become "ex-
acerbated to the extent that the defendant perceives his new-
found 'indigency' as a form of punishment imposed by the Gov-
ernment in order to weaken his defense."'190 Thus, attorney fee
forfeiture is the perfect vehicle to destroy the relationship that
often forms so delicately between an attorney and his client.' 9 '
Justice Blackmun suggested that the immediate effect of at-
torney fee forfeiture would be to compromise the discovery of
truth. An attorney's interest in preserving his fees from forfei-
ture may lead him to avoid learning the truth, which may ad-
versely affect his client's best interests. 92 The long-range results
of this forfeiture practice will be to ultimately "decimate the pri-
vate criminal-defense bar."'9 3 As the use of the forfeiture provi-
sions spreads exponentially throughout the profession - across
new categories of federal crimes and soon thereafter to the
states - He argued that only the most idealistic and least
skilled attorneys, many of whom will be fresh out of law school,
would be attracted to the field, "while the remainder [of the
criminal defense bar would] seek greener pastures elsewhere.' 94
Thus, he concluded, attorney fee forfeiture "substantially under-
mines every interest served by the Sixth Amendment, on the in-
dividual and institutional levels, over the short and the long
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2675.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Winick, supra note 29, at 781-82.
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haul.",95
IV. Analysis
The federal courts have generally agreed that a plain mean-
ing interpretation of the forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE
lends support to the government's position that attorneys' fees
are forfeitable pursuant to the CFA. 198 Conceding that the CFA
was drafted with the intent to cover at least some types of attor-
neys' fees, the real inquiry is whether its application to all de-
fense attorneys' fees is constitutionally permissible.
A. Right to Counsel and the Diminished Opportunity to Re-
tain Experienced Legal Counsel
The sixth amendment right to representation by counsel is
a concept of fundamental importance in our society. 97 It pro-
vides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense."' 9 8 This right was designed to assure fairness in the ad-
versarial criminal process. 99 Closely affiliated with a defendant's
right to counsel is the right to a fair and reasonable opportunity
to retain the counsel of his choice.200 The right to choose an at-
torney is a significant factor in allowing the defendant to decide
what type of defense to mount. 01 The sixth amendment
" 'grants to the accused personally the right to make his de-
fense,' because 'it is he who suffers the consequences if the de-
fense fails.' "20 Indeed, it has been said that "the most impor-
195. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. See supra note 41.
197. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
199. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
200. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53. This right is not absolute; it is qualified by the defend-
ant's ability to afford the fee and it must be carefully balanced against the public's inter-
est in the orderly administration of justice. See Note, supra note 23, at 675. See also
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
201. Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 277 n.2, 279 n.5 (6th Cir. 1985). The Wilson
court determined that where defense counsel engaged in heated confrontation with trial
judge rather than cross-examining witness, as well as ignoring client's statements of dis-
satisfaction, an irreconcilable conflict between interests of defense counsel and those of
defendant was found. Id.
202. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 165 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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tant decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his
selection of an attorney.""2 '
The CFA, as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court,
will cause many criminal defense attorneys to become uninter-
ested and unwilling to represent a client if their legal fees are
susceptible to forfeiture upon conviction. 04 This chain of events
will effectively cripple a RICO or CCE defendant's ability to re-
tain counsel of choice. 0 5
(quoting Farreta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975)). "Giving the defendant the
ability to select his own counsel ... [through personal choice] furthers participatory and
autonomy values." Winick, supra note 29, at 803-04.
203. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979). It is likely that a defend-
ant would have more faith and reliance on an attorney he chose rather than one who was
appointed for him. See note, supra note 23, at 676. However, it would be difficult to
show that a privately retained attorney may create a different result than the one
reached. Under the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington,'466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
defendant must establish that first, the attorney's particular conduct was deficient with
respect to the reasonableness standard of "prevailing professional norms" and second, a
defendant must establish that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 688-
89.
204. See supra notes 88 & 93 and accompanying text. "[In addition to depriving a
defendant of counsel of choice, there will be instances in which the threat of forfeiture
will deprive the defendant of any counsel." United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657,
2674 n.14 (1989) (emphasis in original). See also Cloud, supra note 33, at 44-45; Note,
supra note 34, at 133-35. Very few attorneys would be willing to take on these long and
complex defenses without an assurance of payment. It is not profitable, nor a smart gam-
ble to be retained -by an individual indicted in a RICO matter. "A lot of lawyers are
saying it's just not worth it." Chambers, Criminal Lawyers in Study Say New Laws
Inhibit Case Choices, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. 1 (quoting William J.
Genego, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California Law Center, who con-
ducted a survey of members of the National Association of Defense Lawyers). Attorneys
are afraid of not only losing their fees, which few can afford to do, but also of becoming
targets themselves of "undercover operations." Id.
205. "Indictments are notoriously easy to obtain"; the restraining order thus im-
poses a stringent penalty without the determination of whose interests are paramount.
United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1476-77 (1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.
1987). Although the government does have an interest in precluding criminals from em-
ploying ill-gotten financial power to hire attorneys, this intetest simply does not out-
weigh an accused's constitutional right to counsel of choice. Id. at 1403 (Feinberg, C.J.,
concurring). The small cost to society of possibly permitting criminals to use their ille-
gally acquired wealth to hire an attorney is the price the public must pay to protect the
rights of the innocent. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1403 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). If this
presumption of innocence was not present in our criminal justice system, an innocent
individual accused of a crime could be deprived of legitimate economic power to wage a
full defense. Again, it is the "cost of our adversarial system, which places great value on
protecting the rights of the accused." Id. The problem with the CFA is that it deprives
defendants of their financial resources to hire a lawyer before they are proven criminals.
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Not only does the accused have a qualified right to counsel
of his choice, he has an absolute right to effective assistance of
counsel.20 The right to effective assistance of counsel demands
that a defendant be granted the right to choose representation
by counsel who is experienced and proficient in the RICO field
and who is free from conflicting interests."' Therefore, the ap-
propriate inquiry must focus on the adversarial process to en-
sure that a defendant is represented by an effective advocate. 0
If lawyers' fees are subject to forfeiture contingent upon
their clients' acquittals, attorneys will have interests that may
directly conflict with their clients' interests.0 9 Although it is not
argued that all attorneys would pursue situations of potential
conflict, it is certainly foreseeable that some would embark upon
this avenue - conflict becomes inevitable whenever forfeiture
is a possibility. When placed in this desperate situation, some
attorneys may not wish to elicit facts that suggest that their fees
were derived from illegal activities.21 0 Thus, the distinct possibil-
Id. at 1403-04. Moreover, it makes available to these defendants only the "maverick and
risk-tak[ing]" attorney from the private sector, for arguably only these attorneys would
risk their fees for such a cause. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
207. Appointed counsel is probably unable to mount a suitable defense for a RICO
or CCE defendant. The length and complexity of these defenses make the public de-
fender offices, which already lack the human resources to perform the requisite prepara-
tory work, incapable of countering the effort of the Justice Department. See Krieger,
Lawyer, Client and New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737, 739 (1984). See also Caplin &
Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). "The costs of mounting a defense of an indictment
under RICO are far beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal public de-
fenders' office which is already over-taxed." United States v. Rogers, 602 F.Supp. 1332,
1349 (D. Colo. 1985). See also United States v. Madeoy, No. 86-0377 (D.D.C. Oct. 2,
1987)(WESTLAW, Allfeds database [1987 WL 32]). An unaided layman may have little
skill in arguing the law or in coping with an intricate procedural system. Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Similarly, an attorney who is inexperienced in the type of
representation required in these weighty matters may not present a sufficient or ade-
quate defense for his client. See Cloud, supra note 33, at 48-49. See supra notes 225-26
and accompanying text.
208. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). See also Cloud, supra note
33, at 34.
209. The Caplin & Drysdale majority opinion relegated this critical inquiry con-
cerning ethical considerations to mere footnote status. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at
2656 n.10.
210. "[T]he attorney's obligation to thoroughly investigate his client's case would
conflict with his interest in not learning facts tending to inform him that his fee will be
paid with proceeds of an illegal activity .... United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp.
1191, 1197 (E.D. Va. 1986), afl'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (1987),
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ity exists that their clients' interests will be sacrificed due to the
temptation to choose litigation strategies that are more likely to
preserve their fees.2 1
By prohibiting post-trial fee recapture, the brutal concern of
an attorney's conflict of interest can be avoided.1 2 Forcing a de-
fendant to bear this risk of conflict of interest, as the CFA cur-
rently does, in essence forces the defendant to bear the risk of
ineffective assistance of counsel, which violates the sixth amend-
ment. Thus, absent a sufficient showing by the government to
legitimize the restraining order, it is imperative that RICO and
CCE defendants not be made to shoulder the risk that private
counsel may be deterred by the prospect of disgorging their fees
when the trial is over.
Further, the existence of the attorney-client privilege may
be as fundamental to effective assistance of counsel as the re-
quirement of representation free from thwarting conflicts of in-
terest.21 3 The primary purpose of the privilege is to reduce a de-
fendant's fear of incriminatory disclosure and thus encourage
"full and frank communication between attorneys and their cli-
ents."2 A defendant must have confidence in the attorney who
will represent him because the "basic trust between counsel and
client[] is a cornerstone of the adversary system."2 ' By subject-
ing attorneys' fees to forfeiture, the government will "chill" this
fundamentally respected rapport between a client and his
counsel. 1 6
rev'd en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), afJ'd sub nor. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
.109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). In addition, the "reasonably without cause to believe" standard of
section 853, used in connection with an attorney's determination of whether the assets
were linked to the alleged activities, necessarily compromises the effectiveness of an at-
torney's counseling and defense offered to a client since the attorney has incentive to
remain ignorant about the origin of the assets in order to circumvent fee forfeiture. See
supra note 192 and accompanying text; See also United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.
Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
211. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
212. United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
213. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
214. Id. at 389.
215. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162
(1982).
216. Cloud, supra note 33, at 57-58. The serious conflicts of interest that may occur
between an attorney and his client, due to subjecting attorneys' fees to forfeiture, place
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B. Balance of Power in RICO and CCE Proceedings
1. Evidentiary Standard
The "balance of forces between the accused and the ac-
cuser" is central to the concept of constitutional due process.217
Thus, under the current law, before a court can issue a precon-
viction restraining order prohibiting a RICO or CCE defendant
from transferring his property, the government must demon-
strate that there is a probable likelihood that a nexus exists be-
tween the property and the alleged criminal activity. These de-
terminations must be made at a full hearing; the government
cannot rely on an indictment alone to justify forfeiture.218 The
statute, however, mistakenly requires persons seeking to avoid
the imposition of the criminal penalty to prove their innocence
rather than requiring the government to prove their guilt. This
application of the CFA permits government prosecutors to fall
short of the heightened evidentiary burdens required to estab-
lish guilt. In criminal matters, prosecutors carry the burden of
proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure
a conviction of the accused. When the CFA is applied after ob-
taining a mere indictment the government's evidentiary burden
is lessened and the accused is effectively convicted prior to hav-
ing received a trial on the merits. This undermines the founda-
tion of the American criminal justice system which is premised
the statutory provision on questionable grounds. More generally, ethical considerations
run to the very heart of the American justice system. The relationship established be-
tween an attorney and his client is one based on trust; this trust is promoted by the
attorney's duty to preserve confidences and secrets of the client. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1982). The relationship is fostered through the
confidentiality mechanism known as the attorney-client privilege. See Upjohn, 449 U.S.
at 389. Further, the attorney owes an ethical duty to advance his client's best interests
within the bounds of the law. See Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 995 (1986).
By gambling with the prospect of losing his fee upon the finding of his client's guilt,
the defense attorney's fee is transformed into a fee which is tantamount to contingent.
To accept a contingent fee in a criminal matter is clearly prohibited by community stan-
dards for fear of compromising the defendant's best interests. See MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1982). Further, contingency fees in criminal
cases are not only against public policy, they have been recognized as illegal and unen-
forceable under contract law. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 542 (1932).
217. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
218. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981).
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upon the concept of an accused's presumption of innocence.219
2. The Interest Affected
In addition to the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
manner, the specific dictates of due process require the identifi-
cation and consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.22
This balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge22 may be implemented in the realm of at-
torney fee forfeiture as a means of softening the impact of the
CFA.2"2 First, the private interests at stake in a RICO or CCE
context are of paramount importance since a defendant risks a
substantial prison term and possible fine if convicted; '23 there-
fore, he must be afforded the opportunity to mount a sufficient
and adequate defense. Moreover, the characteristics of the CFA
219. The key to Justice White's majority opinion, and the majority analyses in
Nichols and in Caplin & Drysdale, is the statutory engagement of the relation-back doc-
trine. The misconception of these analyses is that the government's interest in forfeited
property is not derived from a common law ownership right to the property. Nichols, 841
F.2d at 1510 (Logan, J., dissenting). "The government neither owned the property before
the crime nor gave value for the property as a creditor or purchaser does." Id. The gov-
ernmental purpose that justifies forfeiture of a common law owner's property is to de-
prive an individual of the rewards from criminal activity, to confiscate the resources to
prevent the commission of further crimes, and to punish. Id. at 1511. The pre-trial
seizure is justified only to the extent of possible dissipation or concealment. Id. Thus, the
application of the property law figment in the criminal forfeiture context undermines a
defendant's presumption of innocence. United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1559
(D. Utah 1987); see also United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1476 (1986), modified,
809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
220. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citation omitted).
221. Id.
222. "Prior to conviction, sole title to such assets - not merely possession
- rests in the defendant; no other party has any present legal claim to them."
Monsanto 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988) (calling for sentences of up to 20 years in addi-
tion to possible fines as great as $25,000).
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could result in the accused losing not only property used or ac-
quired as a result of alleged illegal activity, but potentially his
entire estate since, in most cases, the property sought to be
seized is a derivative proceed from crime.22
The second inquiry focuses on whether the procedures re-
lied upon will enhance the outcome of the proceeding. A RICO
or CCE defendant's ability to use otherwise restrainable assets
to secure defense counsel of choice will only work to make the
proceeding advance in a more efficient and expedient manner.
Because of the nature of the complex proceeding and the often
lengthy duration of the preparative and court activities,225 ade-
quately funded, expert counsel of choice will be better able to
conduct an efficient defense rather than a public defender, who
is constrained by limited assets, inexperience in RICO and CCE
matters and lack of time.226 Thus, the accused's ability to use
otherwise potentially forfeitable assets to retain counsel of
choice will only improve the quality of the proceeding and,
therefore, ultimately benefit the public interest.
224. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2676. To pose a hypothetical: an indi-
vidual, previously engaged in illicit activities, has ceased those activities and has estab-
lished a private business from the proceeds of his earlier enterprises. This business per-
forms well and he purchases a home, a car, and other items. Because his net worth was
established from the proceeds of his illicit conduct, his entire estate is subject to govern-
mental forfeiture. See Comment, RICO and the Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Removing
the Adversary from the Adversary System?, 62 WASH. L. REv. 201, 205 n.27 (1987).
225. RICO cases often involve a considerable amount of time, money, and expertise
because of the complexity of the issues. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332
(D. Colo. 1985). "Adequate defense[s] of RICO cases generally require representation
during grand jury investigations lasting as long as two or three years. Counsel appointed
ninety... days before trial is patently inadequate." Id. at 1349-50. For the complexity of
a RICO prosecution, see United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). "The magnitude of the
effort required . . . for careful review . . . is reflected both by the size of the rec-
ord - more than 80 volumes containing some 12,000 pages of trial transcript and some
3,000 pages in the volumes of pleadings .... Id. at 985-86 n.4.
226. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. This is not to say that public
defenders are patently inadequate or incompetent; quite the contrary, the accomplish-
ments and capabilities of the public defender's office nationwide have been and continue
to be, extraordinary. It merely suggests that since they were never intended to replace
private attorneys, as a substitution in kind, private attorneys may provide greater repre-
sentation for these RICO and CCE defendants because of a specialty that they may have
developed having represented many defendants in like situations. Further, a private
counsel may have greater investigative and research capabilities available to him than
the court appointed attorney, See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo.
1985).
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The final consideration under the Mathews' criteria is the
government's interest in the forfeited attorneys' fees weighed
against permitting the accused to retain an attorney with these
funds. 27 To that end, the question becomes whether counter-
vailing governmental interests actually exist to justify the "dras-
tic expedient" of freezing and eventually forfeiting RICO and
CCE defendant's assets such that they cannot retain private de-
fense counsel.228 In any event, the government's interest is
served whether the fees are forfeited or are used to retain coun-
sel; that is, in either scenario the criminal is separated from the
ill-gotten gains.229 Thus, the government interest is not harmed,
because the overriding institutional factor is to serve the public
interest which, by permitting the operation of an efficient, expe-
dient, and fair criminal justice system, is promoted as well.
3. The Power of the Restraining Order
The government is provided with an unfair advantage over
RICO and CCE defendants by permitting a restraining order to
be appended to an indictment. ' 30 The restraining order alerts
talented defense counsel to the piercing threat of fee forfei-
ture.23 1 This may permit the government to selectively exclude
the more skilled and experienced defense attorneys simply by
attaching the restraining order to the defendant's indictment.23 2
227. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also supra notes 220-21 and
accompanying text.
228. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 652
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
229. See Cloud, supra note 33, at 47.
230. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text. The government should not
be permitted to cripple the defendant at the commencement of his trial by removing his
ability to retain counsel. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1477 (5th Cir. 1986),
modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987)(Rubin, J., concurring).
231. If attorneys' fees are made vulnerable to forfeiture, RICO and CCE defendants
will be unable to hire counsel. United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (D. Md.
1986). "[B]y the forfeiture ...statute's [permissible application to defense attorneys'
fees], we insure that no lawyer accept the business." United States v. Badalamenti, 614
F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2674 (1989).
232. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985). See also Cloud, supra note 33,
at 43-44. Further, the forfeiture of attorneys' fees impedes, rather than advances, the
efficient and orderly administration of justice. Scenarios are certainly foreseeable where
defense attorneys resign prior to and during trial rather than risk the forfeiture of their
compensation for their efforts from a full litigation. In fact, an attorney made a trip from
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An imbalance is likely to result from this granting to the govern-
ment of carte blanche over who would represent a RICO or CCE
defendant.233 This resulting imbalance would disrupt the fair
and balanced administration of justice.234 Thus, an attorney
whose fees are potentially forfeitable will be "forced to operate
in an environment in which the government is not only the de-
fendant's adversary, but also his own." 35 The very premise of
the American criminal justice system is that partisan advocacy
on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective
of our adversary system. 3 6 Further, defense counsel will lose
their independence and autonomy by cooperating with prosecu-
tors who possess the power to seek forfeiture in their cases.23 If
sanctioned, the end result would force all RICO and CCE de-
fendants to seek court-appointed counsel and thereby permit
the government to control the members of the adversarial pool it
is to face.23 8 In addition, government's implementation of the re-
Boston to inquire about Monsanto's defense and the possibility of representing him in
connection with the charges he faced, but refused to render assistance until the district
court settled the attorneys' fee concern. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 86 (2d
Cir. 1987). This situation wastes the court's valuable time by disrupting trials and results
in higher court costs due to the untimely and inefficient delay. United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (E.D. Va. 1986).
233. Reckmeyer, 611 F. Supp. at 1196-97. "The costs of mounting a defense of an
indictment under RICO are far beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal
public defenders office which is already over taxed." Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. Fur-
ther, "federal defenders' offices cannot marshal the wherewithal required to counter the
human and financial resources the Justice Department devotes to these complex cases."
Cloud, supra note 33, at 48.
234. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 86 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Judge Oakes expressed con-
cern regarding the systemic interest of permitting defense attorneys to perform their
proper role in the adversary system of justice. Id. (Oakes, J., dissenting). "[T]he very
premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and
the innocent go free." Id. See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984);
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
862 (1975).
235. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2664, 2675 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984).
237. Although the Payden court dismissed this realistic alarm because it believed
that the courts would prevent this malady from infiltrating the system, it did not present
a means of determining which counsel were selectively excluded by subjecting their fees
to forfeiture. Payden v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 605
F. Supp. 839, 853 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
238. Cloud, supra note 33, at 47-54. The criminal justice system cannot permit this
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lation-back 239 doctrine places the accused in a financial quan-
dary which renders him effectively indigent.4 0 If the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel must yield to countervailing
government interests, the relation-back device would be an ap-
propriate measure to promulgate the government's con-
cerns - nevertheless, it surely cannot serve as a substitute for
them.24' Thus, the Justice Department's construction of the
CFA undermines the system's objectives by shifting the balance
of interests away from the defendant and toward the
government.4 2
C. The Approach for the Future
The correct approach to the attorney fee forfeiture question
is clearly not to be gleaned exclusively from the majority opinion
of the Supreme Court in Monsanto. Moreover, the correct ap-
proach is not located solely within the insightful commentary of
type of laissez-faire representation when incarceration is faced as the ultimate punish-
ment. Id.
239. Although the government employs the relation-back fiction as a powerful tool
in its arsenal under RICO to seize allegedly tainted property, it typically has no more
right in that property than the accused because of the derivative nature of the property.
This property was not itself acquired illegally, but merely purchased or initiated with
allegedly tainted assets. Hence, "prior to [a] conviction, sole title to such assets - not
merely possession, as is the case .. . [when considering a bank robbery . . . . -rests in
the defendant; no other party has any present legal claim to them." United States v.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2676 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240. Thus, the government's argument simply begs, rather than answers, the consti-
tutional question because the courts are not dealing with a financially indigent individ-
ual, but instead, they are passing judgment on someone who was placed in this dire
position by unbridled government discretion. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 652 (4th Cir. 1987)(en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
241. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 652)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Fourth Circuit Judge Phillips contended, the constitu-
tional right to private counsel cannot be permitted to hang on the thread of uncontained
legislative indulgence." Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 652 (Phillip J., dissenting). Fur-
ther, the analysis advanced by the Nichols measure, which today permits a pretrial
seizure and subsequent forefeiture of property may be applied tomorrow to anyone in
violation of federal antitrust or environmental laws. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d
1485, 1509 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1989)
242. "A man who stands accused of crime is no less entitled than his accuser to
freedom and respect as an innocent member of the community." Tribe, An Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 404
(1970).
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Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion. 43 Rather, it is one neces-
sarily composed of discreet segments of many of the views ad-
vanced by the federal courts that have confronted this critical
issue. In addition to Justice Blackmun's analysis of the problem,
Chief Judge Feinberg's and Judge Oakes' concurring opinions in
the Second Circuit Monsanto rehearing best describe the proper
direction upon which to focus the inquiry. 4 4 The dissenting
views espoused by Judge Phillips of the Fourth Circuit, regard-
ing the imperative balancing of interests between the govern-
ment and the accused,2 45 and Judge Logan of the Tenth Circuit,
concerning the need to concentrate on the constitutional issue
presented and not become moved by "emotional revulsion" to
the nature of the acts involved,2 46 also have considerable merit
and, therefore, cannot be ignored.
If the statute is to be amended, that amendment must
clearly and explicitly state its intention to subject such attor-
neys' fees to forfeiture upon conviction. Only upon a proper
trial-type hearing, which focuses on the narrow issue of asset ori-
gin, will the government have the proper forum to establish the
forfeitability of a defendant's attorneys' fees to the government.
At this hearing, the government should be required to prove at
least by clear and convincing evidence, if not beyond a reasona-
ble doubt,247 that the assets in question are linked to the alleged
criminal activity. If the government fails to meet this heightened
burden, then the defendant's property must be released to the
extent necessary for him to pay reasonable attorneys' fees2 48 in
connection with his defense to the criminal charges faced. This
is the only appropriate measure that can be generated for a soci-
ety that has as its benchmark of its criminal justice system the
notion of a presumption of innocence in connection with one
who has been accused, but not yet tried, of a crime.
243. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2664 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
245. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
246. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
247. The "probable likelihood" standard envisioned by the panel majority's "Mon-
santo hearing" is too easily met. The statute is a criminal statute; thus, the accused's
presumption of innocence in a criminal proceeding cannot be compromised by a stan-
dard that is more akin to the civil standard of a mere "preponderance of the evidence"
rather than that of the criminal law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51.
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Hence, the CFA should first be revised such that the gov-
ernment is required to specifically identify the assets allegedly
linked to the criminal activity. This specificity will remove the
vagueness from the expansive language of the current statute.
Second, a hearing should be implemented in order to establish
the status of the property identified in the government's re-
straining order." 9 Third, the burden on the government to show
that the assets forfeitability must be increased from the current
"probable likelihood" standard of forfeitability to the higher
criminal standard of at least "clear and convincing evidence" if
not "beyond a reasonable doubt. '250 This amendment will lend
clarity to the indecisive language and cloudy legislative intent of
the earlier provisions.
By providing this elevated standard in an amendment to
the CFA, a RICO or CCE defendant's presumption of innocence
will be retained and his right to counsel of choice will be pre-
served. The engagement of this safeguard will necessitate that a
prosecutor prove his case at all stages of the prosecution in or-
der to secure a conviction of the accused. If those assets alleg-
edly linked to the criminal activities so charged against that de-
fendant are now declared forfeitable, a RICO or CCE defendant
has no valid claim of being unable to secure counsel since the
government will have established by the requisite burden that
the assets are not his to use. A RICO or CCE defendant would
then have to rely on court-appointed counsel or private counsel
willing to assume the defense knowing that his fees are subject
to forfeiture.
It will be necessary, however, to purge those assets from the
defendant's forfeitable estate in order to pay for the accused's
counsel of choice at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. This cost
for legal fees is a necessary one for our society to bear in order to
ensure that the goals of the criminal justice system are satisfied.
If this safeguard was not included in an amendment to the CFA,
249. See supra notes 220-42 and accompanying text.
250. This greater burden placed on the government will provide an increased proce-
dural check against prosecutorial abuse. The government's effective unbridled discretion
regarding circumscribing a RICO or CCE defendant's choice of counsel merely by affix-
ing a forfeiture charge to the indictment will be greatly limited by this new standard. If
the government fails to meet this expectation, the defendant's interest in employing the
property to obtain counsel must prevail.
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the opportunity exists for a defendant who has assets, which are
not linked to the illegal activities he is charged with engaging in,
to suffer the consequences of being effectively sentenced before
his trial from the efforts of an overly zealous prosecutor.251 If a
dispute surfaces regarding the reasonableness of the attorneys'
billing rates, then the fees should be determined by employing a
quantum meruit measure of recovery based on the fair market
value of the reasonable legal services legitimately rendered. For
the pretrial hearing, a sum equal to the value of the rates
charged by the governing community standard of the private
criminal defense bar should be assessed from the assets sought
in the government's restraining order. Further, for the defense
of the charges themselves, a reasonable fee should be deter-
mined from those community standards established in these
type of matters. With these improvements implemented, the
CFA will be able to effectuate its purpose of stripping the eco-
nomic bases of criminal activity without stripping the individu-
als of their constitutional protections.
As Chief Judge (then Judge) Bazelon has stated, "we are in
that terrible period known as 'meanwhile.' We know enough to
be troubled but not enough to know how to resolve our troubles
.. ,252 Once the concerns discussed in this section have been
considered, it is clear that the most logical approach for the Su-
preme Court would have been to strike down the forfeiture stat-
ute as unconstitutional. The Court would then have left no room
for congressional doubt with respect to the need for a revision of
the hastily prepared CFA. Maybe Congress will pay heed to Jus-
tice Blackmun's comprehensive and accurate dissenting opinion
which highlighted some of the most important constitutional
and social considerations that the American criminal justice sys-
tem has faced to date.
251. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text. It warrants cautioning that the
finding at this pre-trial evidentiary hearing must not be permitted to be introduced at
the criminal trial because of the potential prejudicial effect the earlier finding regarding
the criminality of the identified assets may have on the jury.
252. United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring).
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V. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court's five-to-four decision favors
the forfeiture of defense attorneys' fees in the context of RICO
and CCE prosecutions, the well-crafted accurate dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Blackmun identifies the constitutional and policy
concerns facing the practical and institutional facets of the crim-
inal justice system today. The upshot of the long struggle with
attorneys' fee forfeiture throughout the federal courts of this na-
tion has finally settled with a decision that was narrowly fo-
cussed and prepared with insufficient foresight. The Supreme
Court's Monsanto decision of 1989 will not be the culmination of
the issue for the statute's continued application will surely raise
the concerns discussed by Justice Blackmun and the various
other judges who have commented on the subject. Notwith-
standing Monsanto's outcome, the legislature should not be con-
tent with its earlier effort. As Justice Blackmun declared at the
conclusion of his dissenting opinion:
That a majority of this Court has upheld the constitutionality of
the Act as so interpreted will not deter Congress, I hope, from
amending the Act to make clear that Congress did not intend this
result. This Court has the power to declare the Act constitutional,
but it cannot thereby make it wise.253
Steven C. Bauman
253. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2677 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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